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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
CONNIE RAY LUND, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
vs. 
RALPH B. FOLEY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
* * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
CASE NO. 16921 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Order of Dismissal granted · 
by the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, Judge of the Second Judicial 
District Court in and for Weber County, State of Utah, and 
entered in the above entitled matter on the 22nd day of 
January, 1980. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Order of Dismissal 
and a remand to the lower court for a full trial on the merits 
or, in the alternative, for a reversal of the Order of Dismissal 
to the extent the same dismisses Appellant's Complaint with 
prejudice so that Appellant may refile Appellant's cause of 
action pursuant to the provisions of Section 78-12-40 Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The origin of this case occurred in November of 1971 
when Plaintiff cut herself by falling through a storm glass 
door at her home. Defendant, a general surgeon in Ogden, was 
sunnnoned to the emergency room and treated her there by exami-
nation, removal of glass fragments and suturing (R-12). He had 
never previously seen her as a patient and saw her on four 
occasions at the office until January 28th of 1972. He never 
heard from her again until January of 1977 when he received a 
telephone call complaining that there were still glass fragments 
in the area of her ribs and that they were to be removed sur-
gically (R-12). 
Notice of intention to connnence the action was served 
upon Defendant October 3, 1977 and this suit was filed December 20, 
1978 (R-1, R-13). 
Depositions of both Plaintiff and Defendant were taken 
March 30, 1979, and jury trial was then set for November 15, 
1979. Upon stipulation of counsel, the trial was continued 
from November 15, 1979 (R-29) to January 22, 1980. The case 
was set for jury trial (R-28) and the jury was waived by the 
Defendant only the day before trial, after being advised that 
Plaintiff would not be present. 
The day before trial, January 21, 1980, Plaintiff's 
counsel called defense counsel regarding a continuance and 
then both counsel spoke by conference call with Judge Wahlquist. 
-2-
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At that time, Plaintiff's counsel advised the Court of the 
reasons for the request of the continuance and defense counsel 
advised the Court of opposition to it. The Court denied the 
request and stated trial would start the next morning. 
On the day set for trial, Plaintiff's counsel appeared 
without his client and defense counsel appeared with his client. 
The motion for continuance was renewed, argued and denied, and 
the order of dismissal with prejudice entered (R-33). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED 
ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE. 
The rules governing granting or denial of continuance 
are basically 40(b) Utah R. Civ. P. and Rule 4.3(a) of the 
District Court Rules of Procedure. For convenience, these are 
set out in full as follows: 
"(b) Postponement of the Trial. Upon motion of 
a party, the court may in its discretion, and 
upon. such terms as may be just, including the 
payment of costs occasioned by such postponement, 
postpone a trial or proceeding upon good cause 
shown. If the motion is made upon the ground 
of tfie· absence of evidence, such motion shall 
also set forth the materiality of the evidence 
expected to be obtained and shall show that due 
diligence has been used to procure it. The court 
may also require the party seeking the continuance 
to state, upon affidavit or under oath the evidence 
he expects to obtain, and if the adverse party 
thereupon admits that such evidence would be 
given, and that it may be considered as actually 
given on the trial, or offered and excluded as 
improper, the trial shall not be postponed upon 
that ground." (Emphasis added). 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"Rule 4.3 Continuances-Civil-(a) Cases set for 
tr,ial shall not be continued upon stipulation of 
counsel alone, but continuances may be allowed by 
order of the Presiding Judge or the Judge to whom 
the case is assigned for trial. No continuances 
shall -be allowed except for good cause shown. 
Said continuances may be granted upon motion of 
counsel made in open court or by written stipu-
lation of the parties and approval of the court. 
A notice of all written motions must be served 
upon counsel for the opposing side in the manner 
prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and these rules. In the event that counsel seeks 
to have the hearing of the same in less than five 
(5) days from the time of the service of the 
motion, an order permitting the same and directing 
that the notice be served, must be entered by 
the cou1='t and s~rved upon counsel with the motion." (Emphasis added,. 
Fundamental in the rules is that good cause must be 
shown and that the matter is in the discretion of the trial 
court. 
There is no hard and fast standard by which this is 
measured and the trial court must indeed be granted considerable 
latitude in making its determination. 17 Am.Jur2d Continuance 
§3 Page 120 states the rule as follows: 
"But in the absence of such a statutory provision 
or such a statutory construction, the rule is 
universally recognized that the granting or 
refusal of a continuance rests in the discretion 
of the court to which the application is made, 
and its ruling thereon, in the absence of an 
abuse of discretion, will be upheld on review." 
The absence of a party may under certain circtunstances 
be grounds for granting of a continuance. However, a clear 
showing of ·good faith and diligence is required therefor, and 
a party seeking such a delay cannot subordinate the business 
of the court to his own interests or convenience. See 17 Am.Jur.2d 
-4-
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Continuance §17. 
Three Utah cases deal with continuance. Bairas v. 
Johnson, 373 P.2d 375, 13 Utah2d 269 is the first. In that 
case, a continuance was requested based upon the affidavit 
(unchallenged) of Plaintiff's attending physician in California. 
The affidavit stated the Plaintiff's physical condition was not 
such that he could travel to attend the trial and that he would 
in fact be undergoing serious surgey during the week the trial 
was scheduled. Clearly in Bairas, Plaintiff was unarguably 
unable to attend and this was due to matters outside his control. 
There is a clear distinctipn between Bairas and the present 
case. 
Maxfield v. Fishler, 538 P.2d 1323 (1975) involved 
a motion for a continuance on the morning of trial. The court, 
in its discretion, denied the motion and dismissed the case 
with prejudice. No abuse of discretion was found in the matter 
in that no justification for the continuance was shown as 
required by Rule 40(b). 
First Security Bank v. Johnson, Utah 1975, 540 P.2d 
521 also affirmed a denial of a continuance. The motion 
apparently was predicated on two bases. 
(1) The trial date would jeopardize Plaintiff's 
job, a~d, 
(2) Plaintiff was in other conflicting federal 
litigation. 
-5-
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The denial of the continuance was unanimously con-
firmed by this court. 
Applying the basic law to our case, we find that 
jury trial was noticed in November of 1979 for hearing on 
January 22, 1980. The day before trial, Plaintiff's counsel 
requested a stipulation for a continuance which was denied by 
by defense counsel. That same day a telephone conference call 
with the judge took place in which counsel stated the grounds 
of the request for a continuance and the court denied the tele-
phone motion. 
Upon being advised that Plaintiff would not in fact 
be there, Defendant then waived the jury and the case came on 
for a non-jury trial the morning of January 22, 1980 in Ogden 
before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist. 
At that time, Plaintiff's counsel renewed the motion 
for a continuance. Defendant was present with his client, Dr. 
Ralph Foley (R-37). The position advanced is reflected in the 
record at R-38, Lines 4 through 13: 
"MR. FRANK: That's correct, your Honor. It's 
her opinion that she has to remain in Las Vegas 
to appear as a witness before this administrative 
agency in their investigation of her friend. 
That is the sole basis she's given me for her 
nonappearance today. 
THE COURT: You don't even know what day she is 
going to be a witness or anything of this sort? 
MR. FRANK: I think it's sometime during this week, 
your Honor, but other than that, I'm not in a D' 
position to represent a specific date to the Court." 
-6-
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This motion for continuance was then denied by the 
court and an order thereupon entered the same day dismissing 
Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice (R-32). 
At most, Plaintiff's showing is that for her own 
reasons and purposes, she deci~ed to put the importance of an 
administrative hearing in Nevada ahead of the scheduled trial 
of her own lawsuit in District Court in Utah. There is no 
showing or even representation that she was required to attend 
such hearing, but just that she wanted to in order to help her 
friend. 
We have serious doubts that even a showing of being 
subpoenaed in another forum through an administrative agency 
action would take precedent over the District Court of Weber 
County, a court of general jurisdiction which had scheduled 
two days well in advance for the trial of this lawsuit. 
Clearly it was not an abuse of discretion for Judge 
Wahlquist to deny the request on the limited showing made by 
Plaintiff. The court had scheduled its facilities for two 
days, surmnoned (and then dismissed) a jury, Defendant had 
scheduled two days out of his practice for the trial of this 
lawsuit, and Defendant's counsel had likewise scheduled two 
days for the exclusive purpose of trying the lawsuit. 
To allow the court's schedule to be disrupted just 
by Plaintiff's intentional decision to support a friend in an 
unnamed proceeding of some type would be unconscionable. 
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Certainly an administrative hearing of some type could change 
the order of witnesses appearing to accommodate Plaintiff's 
being in Utah two days during the week the hearing was to be 
made. Apparently no effort was made to accomplish this and the 
only effort made was placed upon Plaintiff's counsel who was 
put in the position of having to seek a continuance without 
any real justification for it. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS 
DISCRETION IN GRANTING A DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE. 
Plaintiff concedes that it is within the discretion 
of the court in a situation like this to enter such a dismissal 
with prejudice. See Appellant's brief, Page _8~-· Here the 
case was regularly called for trial after denial of the motion 
for continuance, Plaintiff had no evidence whatsoever to present, 
and·accordingly, the decision should have been and was on the 
merits. 
It would have done Defendant little good if the 
dismissal had been without prejudice and Plaintiff had been 
allowed under the tolling section of the limitations statute 
to refile her case within one year after the dismissal. That 
would just mean that instead of having his trial in January 
of 1980, he might be faced with a trial in 1981 or 82 arising 
out of the same circumstances. 
If such were the case, in order to get the matter 
finally resolved, Defendant probably would be better off if 
-8-
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the continuance had been granted and trial set for the following 
month. 
Clearly it was in the interest of justice when 
Plaintiff did not proceed with trial at the appointed time 
and presented no evidence or witnesse~ for Defendant to be 
granted relief in the form of a final judgment of dismissal 
with prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
The order and actions of the trial court, both in 
denying the continuance and in entering a dismissal with 
prejudice are clearly supported by the record. The trial 
courts must have control of their own calendars. There was 
no good cause shown in this case and indeed a total lack of 
any real cause for the nonappearance of the Plaintiff at the 
appointed time of trial. Since she chose voluntarily not to 
appear, Defendant was entitled to his day in court and to the 
action the trial court took. The decision should be affirmed 
in all respects. 
DATED this .,!.?- day of July, 1980. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
R~~tlt3vu~ 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
2650 Washington Boulevard 
Suite 101 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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